This stock can produce about 80,000 nuclear weapons. The real current danger
in terms of the nuclear threat of terrorist suitcase bombs is the availability
of weapons grade plutonium to terrorists. It is estimated that a few kilograms
of this material could be purchased on the black market for several million
dollars. There are rumors that attempts to make these purchases have already
occurred. The availability of plutonium for sale to terrorist organizations also
depends on the stability of a country's economy. It is thought that a
destabilized economy increases the likelihood of a transaction with terrorists.
To directly deal with this threat, Congress has initiated and maintained various
program since 1991 to assist Russia in providing adequate security to nuclear
materials, assist in dismantling weapons that were not necessary for its
defense, assisting in converting reactors from plutonium production to power
generation, and providing funding to research facilities so that nuclear
scientists and technicians would not emigrate to other countries and provide
assistance in nuclear weapons technology. These provisions are known as
Nunn-Lugar after the senators who sponsored the initial bill. They are also
known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs. What Can Be Done at This
Time While researching this issue, I frequently came across expert opinion that:
It is not a question of if, but when terrorists will attack using some of these
weapons. In spite of this level of concern by the experts there are no visible
initiatives at the state and community level. In my opinion those initiatives
should include education and organization around prevention and response to
terrorist attacks. There should also be more information available on the
importance of nuclear non-proliferation and assisting Russia with improving the
security of its nuclear stockpiles and expert personnel. I would work on the
following anti-terrorism agenda if elected: 1. Rigorous support for Nunn-Lugar
or CTR programs: Preventing terrorist organizations from getting nuclear
material that could be incorporated into a small device and imported into the
United States is a priority. The best chance we have to do this is to assist
Russian in dismantling their offensive nuclear weapons and supporting research
by their current nuclear scientists into other areas.
These programs have many documented successes, and the potential cost is too
high if we become less vigilant in this area. There are signs that we are
becoming less willing to fund some of these measures. For example, the
installation of radiation detectors at all of Russia's border locations would
cost several billion dollars. Instead we have pledged a few million dollars, or
enough to put detectors at a few key locations. We clearly need more resolve in
this area. Another possible advantage of these programs may be new ideas on how
to reduce and contain chemical and biological weapons. 2. Halting Production of
Enriched Uranium and Plutonium: Both of these elements can be used to build
nuclear weapons. The best way to assure more safety for the United States and
the rest of the planet is to press for the cessation of the production of
enriched Uranium and Plutonium. 3. Support for Recommendations by the Working
Group on Civilian Biodefense: In the initial papers written by this group they
emphasize the need for increased medical awareness and knowledge of these
organisms and toxins. They also prioritize more rapid diagnostic techniques, and
better knowledge about therapy, infection control, and decontamination
strategies. Where it is needed they also recommend improved vaccines and
increased stockpiles and production capacities of the specific vaccine. In the
case of certain bacteria, antibiotic resistance has been demonstrated in the
same organisms used for weapons. The Working Group recommends further study of
this resistance phenomenon. 4. Local Experts and Treatment Protocols: The
knowledge of what to do in a terrorist attack that potentially involves weapons
of mass destruction currently exists in a few specialized facilities in the
country. This expertise needs to be disseminated to local multidisciplinary
teams and members of the medical community. These groups need access to the
latest specialized information and potential hazards. If elected, I will work
very hard in this area to make sure Minnesota has the local experts and they in
turn have access to the information they need to respond to terrorist threats
and actions. 5. Support for Current Counter Terrorism Efforts: The FBI is
currently the lead agency for these efforts. They have been successful in
intercepting terrorists in this country and tracking down terrorists who have
completed an act of violence. An active dialogue between this agency and
Congress is needed to make sure that this agency has the resources and
cooperation it needs to be effective in this area. 6. Preventive measures to
Reduce the Risk of a Successful Attack: The current public literature and
commentary describes a high risk of attack in the next 25 years. So far there
has been very little discussion of what citizens can do to prevent attacks and
protect their families and communities. This discussion has to occur. I do not
believe we can focus only on how to manage the consequences of an attack after
it has occurred. This is an opportunity for involvement by all citizens. If
elected, I will push for these strategies and encourage their dissemination to
all citizens. All of these measures are important priorities because of the
risks inherent in not paying attention to these threats.
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Additional Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare Links
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